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Sacred Trust or Sacred Right?
Some natural tears they dropp’d, but wip’d them soon;
The World was all before them, where to choose
Thir place of rest, and Providence thir guide:
They hand in hand with wand’ring steps and slow,
Through Eden took thir solitarie way.
—John Milton, Paradise Lost

E

dward Walker was a minor when, in 1838, he went to work at sea. Upon
his return, his father, Joseph Walker, claimed Edward’s wages for his
own use. Joseph made what charitably might be called a private settlement
with the owner of the Etna, the ship on which Edward had served. Edward
disputed the settlement, claiming the wages as his own. The federal district
court made note of the general proposition that a father was “entitled to
the earnings of his child by virtue of his paternal power.” On this ground,
Joseph had the right to settle matters on such terms as pleased him. The
general proposition, however, was not as legally dispositive as he would have
hoped.1
The court distinguished between the rights and duties of a father. While
a father’s duties were “indissolubly attached to the paternal relation,” the
same could not be said of a father’s rights. The rights of the father, according to the court, are given to him by the state to enable him to fulfill his
parental duties (“to provide for his child a home, to protect, to maintain,
and to educate him according to the measure of his ability”), and, as a
more concrete compensation, the father is allowed “to take the fruits of his
child’s labor.” But this paternal power is not a “sovereign and independent
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authority.” It is not, to use the court’s comparison, like the patria potestas
enjoyed by the father in ancient Rome, “whose law held children to be
the property of the father, and placed them in relation to him in the category of things instead of that of persons.” This sovereign paternal authority, the court declared, “has never been admitted by the jurisprudence of
any civilized people.” Rather, the father holds only a contingent authority,
“subject to the restraints and regulation of law,” contingent because it is “inseparably connected with the parental obligations, and arises out of them.”
In short, paternal power rests on the fulfillment of paternal duty. Relying
on a deep pool of legal theoreticians, treatise writers, and jurists, including
“[t]he soundest and most esteemed commentators upon the common law,”
the court affirmed what, by the time of this dispute, was a well-settled legal
precept: The power of the parent, because it derives directly from the duty
to benefit the child, is limited in scope and duration. It is only as great as is
needed to secure the child’s welfare: “It is not a power granted to the parent
for his benefit, but allowed to him for the benefit of the child, and it ceases
when the faculties of the child have acquired that degree of maturity, that
it may safely be trusted to its own resources. When, therefore, the parent
abuses this power, or neglects to fulfil the obligations from which it results,
he forfeits his rights.”2
For, at bottom, the child does not belong to the parent. The court stressed
that Edward, like all children, was endowed with a social nature and was
destined for the enjoyment of a social life. As a member of what the court
called “the human family,” Edward was invested—endowed by birthright,
as it were—with all the rights that belong to other members of this universal
family. The court explained,
The Creator of man, in giving to [the child] a social nature and
endowing him with those qualities which fit him for the enjoyment of social life, has imposed upon the parent, as one of the
conditions of his being, the obligation of providing for his offspring while they are incapable of taking care of themselves. But
his children are not on that account born slaves. They do not
become the property of the parent. As soon as a child is born, he
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becomes a member of the human family, and is invested with all
the rights of humanity.
Thus, when the parent fails to fulfill his duty, when he fails to honor the
human rights and social nature of the child, the “protecting justice of the
country” will interpose and deprive him of his authority. The court was
“not aware of any doubt” that the state could take children from their parents and place “them under the care of persons proper to have the control
of them, and to superintend their education.” Indeed, it was the legal and
moral responsibility of the court “to remove a guardian who is unfaithful to
his trust.”3
It is commonly assumed, by academic and lay audiences alike, that parents have long enjoyed a fundamental legal right to control the upbringing
of their children, but this reading of the law is sorely incomplete and anachronistic. Cases like that of Edward Walker suggest that if by “fundamental”
we designate rights with a deep historical pedigree, the right to parent free
from state interference cannot be numbered among them. What is deeply
rooted in our legal traditions and social conscience is the idea that the state
entrusts parents with custody of the child, and the concomitant rule that
the state does so only as long as parents meet their legal duty to take proper
care of the child. Whether custodial authority was called a power or a right,4
it was made contingent on the welfare of the child and the needs of the
state. “[T]he right of parents, in relation to the custody and services of their
children,” Joseph Story wrote in 1816, “are rights depending upon the mere
municipal rules of the state, and may be enlarged, restrained, and limited as
the wisdom or policy of the times may dictate.” Custodial authority, maintained the nineteenth-century libertarian treatise writer Christopher Tiedeman, “is not the natural right of the parents; it emanates from the State, and
is an exercise of police power.”5
These assertions of the ordinariness of parental authority are not isolated
instances. Reviewing the case law of the nineteenth century, Lewis Hochheimer, whose treatise on the law of child custody was a familiar reference
for courts in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, concluded
that “[t]he general result of the American cases may be characterized as
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an utter repudiation of the notion, that there can be such a thing as a proprietary right of interest in or to the custody of an infant.”6 It is true of our
legal past—as it is true today—that claims of right (natural and civil) were
advanced in support of parental power.7 But, as Hochheimer tells us, the
prevailing legal current, driven by the equitable force of trust principles,
swept away such “narrow contentions”: “The entire tendency of the American courts is, to put aside with an unsparing hand all technical objections
and narrow contentions whereby it may be attempted to erect claims of supposed legal right, on a foundation of wrong to persons who are a peculiar
object of the solicitude and protecting care of the law.”8
Traditionally, for both legal scholars and jurists the very word “trust” was
something of a linguistic charm to ward away rights-thinking. For James
Kent, the duty to provide for the maintenance and education of the child is
“a sacred trust”; it is the “true foundation of parental power,” the source of
the authority that the law “has given” to parents. The parent is “absolutely
bound” to serve the child. For Story, parents are only “entrusted with the
custody of the persons and the education of their children” and only as long
as they properly take care of the child. “Why,” Story asks, “is the parent by
law ordinarily entrusted with the care of his children?” His is a simple answer: “Simply, because it is generally supposed, that he will best execute the
trust reposed in him; for, that it is a trust, and of all trusts the most sacred, no
one can well doubt.” For Hochheimer, proprietary principles were a legal
remnant of an antiquated family law; in their place the law had substituted
“the idea of trust as the controlling principle in all controversies in relation
to such custody.” “In true legal conception,” he writes, “[the parent] is simply the agent or trustee of the government.” For Tiedeman, “[t]he parent
has no natural vested right to the control of the child”; parental control is
“in the nature of a trust, reposed in [the parent] by the State . . . , which may
be extended or contracted, according as the public welfare may require.”9
Likewise, and quite early in our juridical history, courts were equally committed to the word and the concept.10 By the mid-nineteenth century the jurisdiction of the courts “to remove infant children from the custody of their
parents, and to superintend their education and maintenance” was not only
“well established” but also considered “indispensable to good order and the
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just protection of society.” This jurisdiction “proceed[ed] upon the theory
that the right of guardianship is a trust for the benefit of the child, and the
parent is not at liberty to abuse it.”11
On this basis, the Etna court was fully prepared to protect the interests of
Edward Walker against the claims of his father. When parents fail “to fulfil
the obligations from which [parental power] results,” the court observed,
the state—as parens patriae, as parent of the country—has a “deep interest” to ensure that its grant of authority is not abused.12 Joseph Walker, it
turned out, had not fulfilled the responsibility entrusted to him, and the
court awarded Edward his just compensation.
Under a trust model of parent-child relations, biology does not beget
rights. It begets responsibilities. The trust model is built on the Lockean
principle that it is the child who has a fundamental right (what William
Blackstone called a “perfect right”): the right to appropriate parental care,
including the entitlement to an education that will prepare the child for
eventual enfranchisement from parental authority. To Locke, the “right of
Tuition” is “rather the Priviledge of Children, and Duty of Parents, than any
Prerogative of Paternal Power.”13 (It is a noteworthy piece of American legal
history that the child’s entitlement to a proper education and the consequent affirmative duty of the state to provide a proper public schooling—a
striking break with negative constitutionalism—have long been enshrined
in our states’ political charters.)14 What biology begets is a duty to ensure
the child’s best interests. “The terms ‘right’ and ‘claim,’ when used in this
connection [that is, the custody of children],” declared Hochheimer, “according to their proper meaning, virtually import the right or claim of the
child to be in that custody or charge which will subserve its real interests.”15
In this connection, then, custodial authority is not a right at all. It is, Hochheimer tells us, “a grant of power flowing from the state, a portion of the
state’s protective care and guardianship.”16
The idea that, historically, American law embodied a strict regime of
parental rights is not easily dislodged. As formidable a scholar as Martha
Fineman has written that, “[h]istorically, fathers were entitled to possession of their children. . . . In essence, fathers had an absolute right to their
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children, ‘owning’ them as if they held ‘title’ to them.”17 Yet the American
legal tradition is one that treated paternal absolutism and its rights foundation as barbaric.18 “That the father had any such absolute right to the care
and custody of his children,” that the state lacked the authority to “control
the conduct of the father in the education of his children”—these propositions, Story wrote, “would strike all civilized countries with astonishment.”19
This confident delimitation of the parent’s “ordinary” rights is nowhere better seen than in child custody cases, where courts challenged, first, paternal
authority and, then, parental control of the child generally. At common
law the father was entitled to the value of his minor children’s labor and
services, a valuable asset, no doubt;20 but he was entitled to the benefit of
the child’s labor “in order the better to discharge his duty.”21 Custody courts
would not presume that, in fact, the parent was appropriately fulfilling the
demands of his role; instead, they would “act according to sound discretion,” consulting the child “if it be of sufficiently mature age to judge for
itself.”22 Where the child was too young to choose for itself, it was a judicial commonplace that “the real interest of the child is the principle which
must govern.”23 The parent retained custody of his—or, as the law evolved,
her—minor children, but this privilege was granted on the presumption
that parents act in the best interests of the child—and this was a rebuttable
presumption. The parental entitlement was good only “so long as [the parent] discharges the obligation imposed upon him by social and civil law.”24
It is sometimes argued that the paramount right of the parent to direct his
child’s upbringing without state intervention, absent a showing of harm,
was so basic as not to need express constitutional protection. In fact, what
was so basic was parental obligation—“[T]he obligation of parental duty is
so well secured by the strength of natural affection,” as Kent wrote, “that it
seldom requires to be enforced by human laws”25—and American custody
courts, only too content to compare their law with the harsh and technical
rules of the English cases, had little taste for a harm standard.26
Far from being absolute, the right of the parent was not even the custody courts’ primary consideration. “The true view,” as one mid-nineteenthcentury court put it, “is that the rights of the child are alone to be considered, and those rights clearly are to be protected.” The very idea that parents
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have rights as parents was called into question. The New York Court for
the Correction of Errors was not alone when it declared that “there is no
parental authority independent of the supreme power of the state. But the
former is derived altogether from the latter.” If parental authority is derived
from the state, the parent does not obtain rights merely by virtue of being a
parent. “It is an entire mistake,” Story concluded, “to suppose the court is
at all events bound to deliver over the infant to his father, or that the latter
has an absolute vested right in the custody.” Similarly, the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania: “[T]he right of parental control is a natural, but not an
unalienable one.”27
Rather, the parent obtains authority, however it is styled, over the child
by virtue of acting as a parent. Indeed, it is the child’s entitlement—the
child’s right “to be surrounded by such influences as will best promote its
physical, mental, and moral development”—that was thought to be in the
way of a natural vested right. In contrast, the right of the parent “to surround the child with proper influences [was] of a governmental nature,”
in the sense that parental authority over the child was considered a benefit
granted by the state in return for parental care of the child.28 This benefit was subject to the principle—again, the debt is to Locke—that what is
due the child is defined, in a general sense, by basic developmental needs
and, more particularly, by the developmental needs of the child destined
from birth to be a member of a liberal constitutional order. Accordingly,
the metes and bounds of parental duty were not considered a matter solely
for private determination. (Nor, for that matter, were the legal parameters
of filial duty.)29 Parents in a liberal society, it was assumed, have no right to
parent as they see fit.
In the law, there are rights and then there are rights. Not all rights are
created equal. Most laws or other forms of state action receive a deferential
review from the courts, despite the fact that they might impinge upon a host
of personal prerogatives. Under rational basis review, courts presume the
constitutionality of legislation. The party trying to overcome this presumption must show (1) that the law serves no legitimate purpose or (2) that the
means employed by the law has no rational relation to the law’s stated goal.
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But laws or other forms of state action that impinge upon rights considered
to be fundamental get a far more skeptical judicial reception. Under a strict
scrutiny standard, courts will presume that such a law is unconstitutional.
To overcome this presumption, the government must show (1) that the law
serves a compelling purpose and (2) that the means employed by the law
are as narrowly tailored as possible to achieve the law’s stated goal. Because
the hurdle of strict scrutiny is so difficult to clear (“strict in theory and fatal
in fact,” it is commonly, if not entirely accurately, said), the level of review
employed by the court can easily dictate the outcome of a case.30 So, it is a
high-stakes determination whether a right is fundamental or not.
The right to parent would be considered an unenumerated right, implicitly protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United
States Constitution (and, both before and after the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, by state constitutional analogues).31 The “liberty” of
the Due Process Clauses safeguards those substantive rights “ ‘so rooted in
the traditions and conscience as to be ranked as fundamental.’ ” These are
rights, like the enumerated freedom of speech, that are considered “of the
very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty.”32 Inevitably, whether an unenumerated right is so rooted and so essential will be a contested, and probably
fiercely contested, question. Inevitably, this is a query with both descriptive
and normative dimensions. Has the right to parent traditionally been treated
as fundamental? Should the right to parent be treated as fundamental? This
book answers no to both questions.
The right to parent as a matter of constitutional law is especially tenuous. The Supreme Court has echoed the popular assumption that the right
of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and nurture of
their children is a fundamental one, time-honored (“perhaps the oldest of
the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court”) and honored
by the work of the Court (“[W]e have recognized the fundamental right
of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of
their children”).33 But no Supreme Court holding supports this claim. No
decision, including the case that is the source of the far-reaching assertions
just parenthetically quoted, has held that the right of parents to make decisions concerning the care of their children is a fundamental one. If the

8

Sacred Trust or Sacred Right?

rigor of the Court with regard to the regulation of parental authority has
varied,34 its scrutiny has never been strict. In fact, as Justice Antonin Scalia
has observed, there is little decisional support for the notion that the right to
parent is a “substantive constitutional right” at all, let alone a fundamental
one.35 More than once, the Court has declined the opportunity to adopt this
position.36
In 1923, in Meyer v. Nebraska, the Court struck down a Nebraska law that
prohibited both the use of foreign languages as a medium of instruction and
the study of foreign languages before the eighth grade. These restrictions
applied to any school, public or private. In 1925, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the Court struck down Oregon’s Compulsory Education Act, which required attendance at public schools. Neither case was really brought to the
Court as, primarily, a matter of parental rights—a litigation choice that itself
should call into question the well-rootedness of such rights; nonetheless, in
both cases the court concluded that, under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the state laws unreasonably interfered with the liberty of parents to direct the upbringing and education of their children.37
But Meyer and Pierce both accept as uncontroversial the principle that
the state can define and enforce the parental duty to educate. The Meyer
Court did not question the authority of the state “to compel attendance
at some school and to make reasonable regulations for all schools, including a requirement that they shall give instructions in English.”38 Here, the
Court reviewed a law that “sought not to require what children must learn
in schools, but to prescribe, in the first case, what they must not learn.”39
The question Meyer considers is how far the state can go in dictating what
the parent can and cannot do.40 The Court answered that the state may not
set up a standard of education and then prohibit any additional or supplemental instruction. If there is a fundamental right at stake in Meyer, it is the
right of the parent, “after he has complied with all proper requirements by
the state as to education, to give his child such further education in proper
subjects as he desires and can afford.”41 In Pierce, the Court pointedly noted
that the case raised no question “concerning the power of the state reasonably to regulate all schools,” a power that included a very substantial
measure of curricular control (“that certain studies plainly essential to good
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citizenship must be taught, and that nothing be taught which is manifestly
inimical to the public welfare”).42 If there is a fundamental right at stake in
Pierce, it is the right of the parent “to provide an equivalent education in a
privately operated system.”43 Broad claims are made for the legacy of these
seminal due process cases,44 but, as Justice Byron White put it, Meyer and
Pierce “lend[] no support to the contention that parents may replace state
educational requirements with their own idiosyncratic views of what knowledge a child needs to be a productive and happy member of society.”45
Meyer and Pierce were as much about rhetorical reach as legal doctrine.
Their anti-statist sentiment would serve as a constitutional banner for those
marching in support of parental rights. That the Court’s support of a right
to parent was the product of judicial activism at its most active—indeed, the
product of a “modern” jurisprudence (built on “more correct ideas” and “a
truer conception” of the proper functions of government) that would, in a
self-conscious break with legal tradition, set the stage for a new era of unenumerated privacy rights—did not (and does not) deter conservative advocates
of parental rights from celebrating the cases that rested on this due process
basis.46 That this right was the product of a Lochner-era constitutionalism
bent on restricting the police powers of the state—indeed, the product of a
narrow, natural law individualism (built on the rejection of a centuries-old
common law legacy of “paternal government”) that would strike down basic
health and safety regulations—did not (and does not) much bother liberal
proponents of the right to parent. To parental advocates on both sides of the
political spectrum, the prerogatives of parenting apparently ease concern
about doctrinal consistency.47
Meyer and Pierce involved only the general interest of parents in the
nurture and education of their children. Where nothing more is at stake,
the Court has said, the state’s authority outweighs due process objections.
Often, though, more is at stake. Legal claims based on the right to parent
often come packaged with claims based on other constitutional protections,
most frequently and forcefully the Free Exercise Clause. Today, religious
parenting rights enjoy a special constitutional protection from state regulation. State action that burdens religious parenting is subject to heightened
judicial scrutiny.
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Why are restrictions on religious parenting rights subject to heightened
judicial review? The obvious answer is that the right of religious freedom
is considered fundamental, but this is only partially correct. The Supreme
Court has said that state action restricting religious practice is constitutionally permissible unless such action directly targets religious practice or discriminates against religious groups. This is the core principle—a controversial one, to be sure—of Employment Division, Department of Human
Resources of Oregon v. Smith. Decided in 1990, Smith held that where state
regulation burdens religious freedom only incidentally—that is, where the
burden is the incidental effect of regulation that is neutral and generally
applicable, restricting secular and religious activity alike—the courts will
presume its constitutionality.48 Thus, for example, a law that makes illegal
the use of peyote because of safety and health concerns would be subject
to, and would survive, rational basis review, even though it burdened the
beliefs and perhaps effectively prohibited the practices of some religious
groups.
Separately, then, neither the right to parent nor the right of religious freedom would trigger strict scrutiny. Combined, however, these rights form
a tough legal firewall that protects parents from state interference in the
religious upbringing of their children. For the Court has also said that when
the interests of parenthood are combined with a free exercise claim, “more
than merely a ‘reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency
of the State’ is required to sustain the validity of the State’s requirement under the First Amendment.”49 This is the core principle, also a controversial
one, of Wisconsin v. Yoder. Though Yoder was decided in 1972, its invention
of a hybrid parenting / free exercise claim survived Smith, as did other variations on the hybrid rights theme. So, even after Smith, the First Amendment does require heightened scrutiny for claims that involve “not the Free
Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with
other constitutional protections,” such as the right of parents to direct the
upbringing and education of their children. In religious parenting cases, by
some abstruse constitutional calculation, strict scrutiny becomes the norm,
despite the fact that state action does not target religion or impinge upon a
fundamental right. Under a strict scrutiny standard, courts will uphold state
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regulation of religious parenting only where “it appears that parental decisions will jeopardize the health or safety of the child, or have a potential for
significant social burdens.”50 Thus, a law that requires parents to send their
children to some form of secondary schooling would be subject to, and
might not survive, strict scrutiny if the parents’ objections to the compulsory
education requirement are religiously motivated.
Writing for the Court in Smith, Justice Scalia cautioned that our society
would be courting anarchy if every law or regulation of conduct that negatively affected someone’s religious belief had to be supported by a compelling state interest. To excuse conduct contrary to a general law “ ‘would be
to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the
land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.’ ”51
Accordingly, the Smith Court discussed hybrid rights as an exception to
general constitutional principles. Yet in the universe of religious parenting
cases, the exception swallows the rule; because such cases are hybrid by
definition, strict scrutiny becomes the norm. The result, if hardly anarchy,
is the creation of a separate sphere of the law—a constitutional anomaly,
as Scalia described it—where the government’s ability to protect children
is subject to an individual parent’s religious beliefs. (Unable to escape this
unacceptable conclusion, the Yoder Court made a fainthearted attempt to
limit its holding to the specific and peculiar facts of the case before it.)52
If Yoder delivered a special right to religious parents, it did so at some
cost to the parentalist cause. (I take the term “parentalist” from the strongly
argued essay by Stephen Gilles titled On Educating Children: A Parentalist Manifesto.53 I use the term broadly to designate those who advocate a
legal and moral regime of considerable deference to parental rights.) For
the Court’s decision means that the right to parent, by itself, does not enjoy
a fundamental status, at least where state regulation of education is concerned. Only where the legal question involves the absolute termination of
parental rights has the Supreme Court required that state action (specifically, a declaration of parental unfitness) meet the tough test of justification associated with strict scrutiny54—though even here, as David Meyer
has pointed out, the balancing of interests undertaken by the Court “is
difficult to square neatly with the traditional strict-scrutiny formula.”55 In
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2000, the Court had the opportunity to give parental rights a constitutional
upgrade. In Troxel v. Granville, the Court considered whether a parent has
the right to deny visitation rights to a child’s grandparents.56 The decision
badly disappointed those hoping for a fundamental rights victory. Though
the Court used the language of fundamental rights, it did not conclude that
strict scrutiny was the proper standard of review, settling instead for a mere
presumption in favor of a fit parent’s visitation choices.
With the Court speaking in uncertain tones, lower courts must contend
with the fact that “the Supreme Court has yet to decide whether the right
to direct the upbringing and education of one’s children is among those
fundamental rights whose infringement merits heightened scrutiny.”57
Protection for parenting rights varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and
from claim to claim;58 and courts have more than enough leeway to decide
the merits of a case by choosing whether to apply a standard based on the
best interests of the child (rational basis review) or a strict scrutiny harm
standard.59 Given this state of affairs, it is not surprising that some parental
rights advocates seek to amend the United States Constitution. The Parental Rights Amendment would declare that “[t]he liberty of parents to direct
the upbringing and education of their children is a fundamental right,” and,
consequently, that strict scrutiny would be the standard of review in cases of
alleged infringement.60
There are good reasons why the right to parent has not enjoyed a fundamental status in the law. To begin with, the right to parent is not one but
many things, a bundle of different interests, each implicating the authority
of parent and state in different ways and to different degrees. No surprise,
then, that “[f]ar from the absolutist’s assumption of strict scrutiny for every
incursion, the Court’s cases reveal a willingness, at least implicitly, to tailor
the nature and strength of judicial scrutiny to the facts of each family privacy controversy.” Yet all parental rights cases have one thing in common
that even more emphatically cautions against strict scrutiny: They involve a
third party, and one who is unable to defend its own interests. Other liberty
interests establish a constitutional shield against governmental impairment
of individual rights, but conflicts involving parental rights—Justice John
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Paul Stevens made this important if, one would think, self-evident point—
“do not present a bipolar struggle between the parents and the State over
who has final authority to determine what is in a child’s best interests.”61
The interests of the child—who may well need the protection of the state,
not protection from the state—and the state’s interest in the child invariably
affect the legal reckoning.
By its very nature, the supposed right to parent is a different creature
from, say, the right of free speech. No one is required to speak responsibly.
No one is required to speak at all. Yet would anyone object to the proposition that parents are required to exercise the right to parent responsibly? Or
that a parent has no right not to parent?62 By definition, then, the parent’s
right to be let alone, to parent free from governmental interference, is and
must be conditional and limited.63 Far from carrying with it a fundamental
right, the decision to parent is inevitably a choice to forego rights otherwise
available to adults. It is always a choice to give up to some extent, and often
to a great extent, the right of individual choosing. There are compelling reasons why parents want to assume the weighty burden of child rearing, and
there are good reasons why the state wants to give parents plenty of room
to do their job; but parental authority over the child is not justified, not in
our legal tradition and culture, by the proprietary interests of the parent as
a rights-holder.
Obviously, not every break with the past is a bad thing; and, as Martha
Minow reminds us, the case against rights can too easily be “levied by people
who do not want to change existing patterns of hierarchy and domination.”64
Just as clearly, and our history unhappily bears more than sufficient testimony to this fact, the parens patriae authority of the state can be badly
abused. To say that a parental rights orientation is not deeply rooted in our
traditions, even to say that parental rights as a normative matter should not
be considered fundamental, is not to declare that a particular policy decision is right or wrong. It is simply to say that it is a question of policy whether
and how the state should regulate parent-child relations. Should we allow,
say, parents to homeschool their children? Is homeschooling in the best interests of the child? Perhaps, perhaps not. Should we allow parents to spank
their children? to compel religious observance, against the wishes of the
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child or against the wishes of a former spouse? to restrict visitation from third
parties? The questions are as varied as the myriad duties parents undertake.
If we think of parenting as a set of responsibilities, not rights, we will not
all miraculously reach the same legal and cultural prescriptions—fiduciary
principles do not inexorably lead in an antiparentalist direction;65 individually, the prescriptions we reach may not always fall into neat ideological
(conservative or liberal) categories—but we will think of these questions as
matters fit for democratic deliberation. To say that a parental rights orientation is not deeply rooted in our traditions is not to answer these questions.
It is to ask them. But by giving parents the right to homeschool children
or compel religious observance or restrict third-party visitation—or, more
generally speaking, by giving parents the right to bring up their children as
they want to—parental rights advocates would forestall public debate on
contentious questions relating to the care and welfare of children. They
would take these questions out of the public domain by keeping the home
under constitutional lock and key.66 The question would no longer be one
of the child’s welfare but of parental entitlement.
This book looks at four related areas of the law: parental custody, state
regulation of education, religion and parental rights, and nonparental thirdparty rights. In each,
1. historically, the authority of the parent has been treated as a
sacred trust, a delegation of state power made on the presumption that it will be employed to promote the eventual enfranchisement of the child (this is the subject of chapter 2);
2. the emergence of a rights orientation has threatened to uncouple the traditional linkage of rights and responsibilities,
subordinating the best interests of the child and the legitimate
needs of the state to parental preferences (this is the subject of
chapter 3); and
3. a renewed reliance on the trust model of parent-child relations
would better serve both the developing personhood of the child
and the civil society to which he or she belongs (this is the
subject of chapter 4).
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In each area of the law, we face the same historical reality: It is the rights orientation that breaks with deeply rooted legal traditions and cultural values,
rejecting time-honored trust principles of family law meant to protect both
private and public interests. For the common law’s careful calculation of
privileges and duties; for its vision of children’s needs as a source of positive
claims on the state; for its sensitivity to evolving cultural mores, a focus on
parental entitlement substitutes a negative rights wall behind which parents
may bring up their children free from both state and nonstate interference.
In this way, the “presentist” assumption that parental rights were always
thus creates the entitlement mistakenly assumed to be a long-standing legal
legacy. If we better understand that, as a descriptive matter, the right to parent is at odds with a cultural tradition of shared responsibility for the welfare
of the child, we might be more ready to ask whether, as a normative matter,
the right to parent should have a fundamental status in the law. We might
be more willing to consider how old equitable principles can lead to new
ways of accommodating the interests of parent, child, and state.67
On occasion the Supreme Court has put the trust model to productive
use. In adjudicating the due process claims of unmarried fathers, for example, the Court has said that the rights of parents “are a counterpart of
the responsibilities they have assumed.”68 This linkage of right and duty,
according to the Court, is the true legacy of its seminal due process parenting cases. Constitutional parenthood embraces the Lockean principle
that “[c]hildren are born to reason,” and the law of nature commands a
parental duty to secure for them “that equal Right that every man hath to
his Natural Freedom, without being subjected to the Will or Authority of any
other Man.”69 On this commitment to the child’s self-determination is predicated the Founders’ theory of human dignity and, of particular salience for
parent-child relations, the parallel theory of human development—the normative psychology of the law, we might say—that, taken together, sustain
the Constitution’s promise of personal as well as political freedom.70 It is the
carrying out of this commitment that defines the trust assumed by parents
and against which parental efforts must be constitutionally measured and
rewarded. Our political charter does not allow for, in or outside the home,
“a utopian conception of society according to which an order having been
laid down all that remains to do is to conform to it.”71
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“Parental rights do not spring full-blown from the biological connection
between parent and child,” Justice Potter Stewart has said. “They require
relationships more enduring.”72 But it is not every enduring parent-child
relationship that merits constitutional protection. If this were the case, then
compulsory schooling laws would fail against constitutional challenges
brought by caring parents. Yet few would disagree that all parents are obligated to look after the educational welfare of their children. It is the trust
model of parent-child relations that directs us to the particular charge that
is the sine qua non of parental power: to secure the child’s “equal Right” to
intellectual and moral autonomy (Locke’s “Natural Freedom”); or, more
simply, to see that children, when they become adults, can choose what life
they want to lead, what values they want to honor, what god they want to
worship.
This duty presupposes that the child is free to form relationships with
those outside the circle of the nuclear family. Hovering over the right to parent is the long-lingering shadow of a property entitlement. Today, the right
to parent is fashioned as a right to personal autonomy, a right of privacy;
yet it remains, essentially, a right to do what one wants with what is “mine.”
But if the child, at birth, “becomes a member of the human family,” then
parents are not free to seclude the child from outside influence. “If we ask
ourselves what actually enables people to be autonomous,” Jennifer Nedelsky writes, “the answer is not isolation, but relationships—with parents,
teachers, friends, loved ones—that provide the support and guidance necessary for the development and experience of autonomy.” Thus, our children
are not and cannot be “ours,” at least not exclusively, not permanently.73
(We ought to be as careful as Shakespeare with possessive pronouns. When
Hermia awakes from her tumultuous midsummer night’s “dream,” she finds
Demetrius “like a jewel / Mine own, and not mine own.”)74 From birth, children are members of a familial community outside and beyond the nuclear
family; from birth, they are members of a political community outside and
beyond the family. It is only by belonging that children can learn, by and for
themselves, where they want to belong.
A trust model of parenting, with its assumption of shared authority over
the child, need not evoke the specter of state paternalism. With regard to
the child’s upbringing, the state also is and also must remain merely an
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educational trustee. The liberal state holds what Locke calls a “Fiduciary
Power to act for certain ends.”75 Like the parent’s authority, the state’s power
over the child is conditional and limited. Ideally, the state, like the ideal
parent, would cultivate the child’s capacity to think and choose freely; it
would foster the child’s courage to challenge any closed set of values, public or private, liberal or conservative. The liberal state wants to pass on its
traditions of freedom, equality, and tolerance, and no doubt the state, like
real parents, can behave less than liberally toward its young people; but the
surest way not to pass on these traditions would be to present them as moral
absolutes to be accepted uncritically.76
For children, though, the threat to freedom of choice and conscience is
no less grave when it comes from private orthodoxies, and the injury to the
child caused by private coercion is no less grievous. In Meyer and Pierce, the
Court feared that the state, through a regime of mandatory public education, would “standardize its children.”77 Yet children sent to private schools
or those kept at home might more easily suffer this fate. We are well cautioned by the pioneering scholar and children’s advocate Barbara Bennett
Woodhouse that “[s]tamped on the reverse side of this coinage of family
privacy and parental rights are the child’s voicelessness, objectification, and
isolation from the community.”78 For this reason, courts should look skeptically at any educational scheme that seeks to restrict “the right to receive
information and ideas.”79 The realm of intellect and spirit is invaded when
children are forced to believe what other people believe, or kept from believing what other people do not believe, even if—and, perhaps, especially
when—these others are their parents or educational and religious mentors.
Thus, if we are not “to strangle the free mind at its source,” the state’s parens patriae duty must “cut[] against the differential regulation of public
and private schools.”80 All children are entitled to an education that is, in
the fullest sense, public: that transports them beyond familiar boundaries;
that provides a check on the narcissism of their guardians, both public and
private; that burdens them with the necessity of moral judgment; and that,
finally, makes them truly free, free to stand and free to fall. A public education is the portal by which children find a place or places on “the great
sphere” that is their world and legacy.81 It is their means of escape from or
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free commitment to the social group in which they were born. It is their best
guarantee of an open future.82
On this basis, the courts should refuse to allow parents to opt out of statemandated educational requirements they consider morally objectionable.
On this basis, too, the courts should not allow parents to make the public
school classroom a forum for their personal religious agenda. Yet if the classroom really is, as the Supreme Court has said, “peculiarly the ‘marketplace
of ideas,’ ” the voices of religious children must be allowed to be heard, too.83
The educational market is a poorer place when school officials cleanse the
classroom of religious references or deny children freedom of religious expression. To this end, the study of religion should be a regular part of a
common curriculum. The public school classroom at every level should
be a forum where students are exposed to diverse viewpoints, secular and
religious. The idea that students benefit from exposure to otherness makes
sense only if this benefit flows in all directions.
A truly public education may well divide child from parent. We should
be entirely forthright and unapologetic about this. The state as educator is
no ideologically neutral actor.84 The philosophical foundations supporting
a public education are the liberal biases of our nation’s intellectual forebearers, biases in favor of a nonauthoritarian approach to truth, of free argument
and debate—what Thomas Jefferson called truth’s “natural weapons”—and
of a healthy sense of human fallibility.85 The open world of public schooling
should be a place where children use these “weapons” to think about values,
whether those values belong to parent or state, or to the “omnivorous peerculture,” or to the cultural oligarchs of the marketplace and the media.86
We should admit as well that these biases will be more compatible with the
beliefs of some religious groups than others.87 Still, it would be a misrepresentation of trust principles to associate them with antireligiosity. Indeed, a
commitment to the child’s open future may be the best guarantee of a society with rich and robust religious traditions. Children are natural religious
seekers. (Recently, there has been talk of a religious generation gap, or,
perhaps better put, a reverse religious generation gap, with children choosing lives of faith, much to the concern, if not dismay, of their more secularminded parents.)88 As young adults, some will choose new spiritual paths
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and some will choose to abandon religious ways altogether, but many, if not
most, will find their faith in traditional places, arriving where they started
and perhaps knowing the place for the first time.89 For religious freedom to
flourish, however, these choices must be genuine ones, based on knowledge
and experience gathered, as it were, out of a multitude of tongues. For the
child’s sake, for its own sake, the state that protects the freedom of adults to
choose a religious or a nonreligious path must also ensure that the freedom
of children to choose their path will not be taken from them. Like adults,
children must be free to seek as well as to find a spiritual home.
The Constitution’s guarantee of personal freedoms is meaningful only
if we, as parents, accept the responsibilities from which parental authority
arises, and the constitutional strength of parenting privileges should depend
on our willingness to do so. The real question is whether parenting furthers the prospective independence of the child. No doubt, there are many
ways to achieve this goal. Treating parental authority as a trust does not
mean denying parents the opportunity, in the words of the political theorist
William Galston, to introduce their children “to what they regard as vital
sources of meaning and value.”90 It does mean that parents may not deny
their children the opportunity to be introduced to new sources of meaning
and value; it does mean that parents may not as a matter of right refuse to
share authority for the upbringing of their children. There is, after all, more
than one form of unlimited government to which children are vulnerable,
and Justice Stevens is certainly correct to caution that “[t]he constitutional
protection against arbitrary state interference with parental rights should
not be extended to prevent the States from protecting children against the
arbitrary exercise of parental authority that is not in fact motivated by an
interest in the welfare of the child.”91
The trust model of parent-child relations heeds this admonitory note. In
their consideration of parenting claims, courts ought not to treat the legal
question as one of parental rights divorced from parental duties.92 Our legal traditions teach that parenthood is first and foremost a responsibility, a
fiduciary duty owed equally to the child and the state. This time-honored
tenet has great room for play in modern times.93 If allowed to, the form
this responsibility takes will evolve, for our understanding of children’s best
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interests—indeed, our very conception of childhood—evolves. Our duty to
the child, however, will remain unchanged.
Like a doctrinal will-o’-the-wisp, the fundamental right to parent continues to beckon constitutional travelers. It is a pursuit driven more by psychology than law. The rhetoric of parental rights speaks to a yearning for
control, for possession of something that is “mine.”94 It evokes some Edenic
time when parents, by right, could tell the state to mind its own business.
It evokes some Edenic place where parents, by right, could command obedience from their children. But there never was such a time and place,
certainly not in the law. In Meyer, the attorney Arthur Mullen stood before
the Supreme Court to denounce the power of the state “to take the child
from the parent.” No state, Mullen argued, should “prescribe the mental
bill of fare” the child will follow.95 His argument supposes that by legal tradition the child is the parent’s to begin with, that the parent can prescribe
the child’s mental bill of fare. To the contrary, trust principles of parenting
testify to the “moral fact that a person belongs to himself and not to others
nor to society as a whole.”96
Though John Milton protested prepublication censorship, Milton’s God
was less troubled by restrictions on the spectrum of available knowledge.
When God’s children disobey his sole commandment—a commandment,
interestingly enough, that would deny Adam and Eve the knowledge of
good and evil—they are cast out of their childhood home and sentenced to
death for their disobedience. In Milton’s telling, their fall, it turns out, is a
fortunate one, their disobedience a prerequisite to “[a] Paradise within . . . ,
happier far.”97 The law of parent-child relations has long embodied a similar
belief that education (a “leading away from”) is the path away from childhood and toward intellectual and moral enfranchisement. Unless children
are to live under “a perpetual childhood of prescription,” unless we are to
deny them the pursuit of happiness, perhaps in the fond hope of providing
happiness, they must be exposed to the dust and heat of the race, intellectually, morally, spiritually.98
With all its attendant joys, parenting is a somber task, for it entails, in a
profound and poignant way, the loss of the child. It is the parent’s task—it
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is a political as well as a personal obligation—to enable each child to form
his or her own self-image rather than merely to conform to some parental
likeness. If we could, we might shield our children from the sufferings that
accompany individuation. If we could, we might shield ourselves from the
pain that accompanies the child’s separation from our hands. Is it any wonder that we would want to transform the sacred trust of parenthood into a
sacred right? But such a right comes at too great a cost. When Adam and
Eve leave Paradise, as Milton recounts the story, they shed some natural
tears, but “the World was all before them,” as it should be for all children as
they enter on the path to adulthood.
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On local custom and the adaptability of American common law, see Ellen
Holmes Pearson, Remaking Custom: Law and Identity in the Early American
Republic (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2011) 11–30.
Blackstone, 1 Commentaries, 440–41; cf. Kent, 2 Commentaries, 231 (“The father . . . has the benefit of his children’s labor while they live with him, and are
maintained by him; and this is no more than he is entitled to from his apprentices
or servants”) (footnote omitted).
Kent, 2 Commentaries, 231; see also Hochheimer, The Custody of Infants (1899),
54–59 (§§ 44–46).
In re Gregg, 5 New York Legal Observer 265, 267 (N.Y. Super. 1847).
Legate v. Legate, 28 S.W. 281, 282 (Tex. 1894).
Kent, 2 Commentaries, 225–26; cf. Kelley v. Davis, 6 Am. Rep. 499, 502 (N.H. 1870)
(“[T]he common law considered moral duties of this nature as better left in their
performance to the impulses of nature”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
See, e.g., Hochheimer, The Custody of Infants (1899), 36–40 (§§ 34–38).
In re Gregg, 5 New York Legal Observer at 267. Mercein v. People ex rel. Barry,
25 Wend. 64, 103 (N.Y. 1840). United States v. Green, 25 F. Cas. 30, 32 (C.C.R.I.
1824). Ex parte Crouse, 4 Whart. 9, 11 (Pa. 1839); cf. In re Ferrier’s Petition, 103 Ill.
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29.

30.

31.

32.
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34.

367, 372 (1882) (“[The court’s] jurisdiction extends to the care and person of the
infant, so far as is necessary for his protection and education, and upon this ground
that court interferes with the ordinary rights of parents in regard to the custody and
care of their children”) (emphasis added).
Legate v. Legate, 28 S.W. at 282.
See, e.g., Swoap v. Superior Court, 516 P.2d 840, 849 (Cal. 1973) (“It is thus abundantly clear that a long tradition of law, not to mention a measureless history of
societal customs, has singled out adult children to bear the burden of supporting
their poor parents”).
Gerald Gunther, “Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection,” Harv. L. Rev. 86 (1972) 1, 8 (internal quotation marks omitted). But see Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515
U.S. 200, 237 (1995) (“[W]e wish to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is ‘strict
in theory, but fatal in fact.’”); see also Adam Winkler, “Fatal in Theory and Strict
in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts,” Vand. L.
Rev. 59 (2006): 793.
See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 80 (1872) (The protection of due process
“has been in the Constitution since the adoption of the fifth amendment, as a restraint upon the Federal power. It is also to be found in some form of expression in
the constitutions of nearly all the States, as a restraint upon the power of the States.
This law then, has practically been the same as it now is during the existence of
the government, except so far as the present amendment may place the restraining power over the States in this matter in the hands of the Federal government”);
see also Calabresi and Agudo, “Individual Rights Under State Constitutions,” 66
(noting that, in 1868, thirty out of thirty-seven states “had clauses in their state
constitutions that explicitly prohibited the deprivation of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law or by the law of the land”).
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122 (1989) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts,
291 U.S. 97, 105 [1934]); see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965)
(Harlan, J., concurring in judgment) (“Judicial self-restraint will . . . be achieved in
this area, as in other constitutional areas, only by continual insistence upon respect
for the teachings of history, solid recognition of the basic values that underlie our
society, and wise appreciation of the great roles that the doctrines of federalism
and separation of powers have played in establishing and preserving American
freedoms”). Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 64, 66 (2000).
The work of David D. Meyer is especially helpful on this point. Meyer argues
that, “notwithstanding the [Court’s] broad language exalting the ‘fundamental’
nature of family privacy rights, the Court in truth has applied something less than
strict scrutiny in their defense.” “What Constitutional Law Can Learn from the
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ALI Principles of Family Dissolution,” BYU L. Rev. 2001 (2001): 1075, 1090; see also
David D. Meyer, “The Paradox of Family Privacy,” Vand. L. Rev. 53 (2000): 527,
536–47 (reviewing cases); Lee E. Teitelbaum, “Family History and Family Law,”
Wis. L. Rev. 1985 (1985): 1135, 1157 (“What is most striking about these cases [where
the Court has drawn a line against state regulation of parent-child relations],
however, is not the strong language they employ in support of values of pluralism
and deference to parental authority but the narrowness of the exceptions they
recognize to state authority in respect of education”); cf. James E. Fleming and
Linda C. McClain, Ordered Liberty: Rights, Responsibilities, and Virtues (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013) 237–72 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s
due process jurisprudence has not relied on strict scrutiny of fundamental rights).
The exceptionalism of family law—specifically, its (sometimes) exemption from
strict scrutiny—is also evident in the equal protection context. See, e.g., David D.
Meyer, “Palmore Comes of Age: The Place of Race in the Placement of Children,”
U. Fla. J. L. & Pub Pol’y 18 (2007): 183; Elizabeth Bartholet, “Where Do Black
Children Belong?: The Politics of Race Matching in Adoption,” U. Pa. L. Rev. 139
(1991): 1163.
35. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. at 92 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Only three holdings
of this Court rest in whole or in part upon a substantive constitutional right of
parents to direct the upbringing of their children—two of them from an era rich
in substantive due process holdings that have since been repudiated”) (footnote
omitted).
36. For example, as Paula Abrams has pointed out, the parent petitioners in Bolling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954)—this is the companion case to Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)—asked the court to hold that segregated public schooling violates the fundamental due process right of parents to direct the education of
their children. See Cross Purposes: Pierce v. Society of Sisters and the Struggle over
Compulsory Public Education (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2009) 217.
Relying on Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), Pierce v. Society of Sisters of the
Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), and Farrington v. Tokushige,
273 U.S. 284 (1927), the parents claimed that “[t]his Court has recognized that
this right includes liberty of choice of parents and their children in the selection
of the type of education which parents and their children think important.” Brief
of Petitioners on Reargument, Spottswood Thomas Bolling, et al., at 51, Bolling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
37. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy
Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). In Pierce, the appellee Society of
Sisters did address parental rights, see Brief of Appellee, in Oregon School Cases:
Complete Record (Baltimore: Belvedere Press, 1925) 321–330, and before the Court
attorney William Guthrie briefly argued the position “that the right of parents to
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41.

send their children to private schools of their own choice is a fundamental, natural
and sacred right,” Transcript of Oral Argument, in Oregon School Cases, 653.
Meyer, 262 U.S. at 402; cf. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 178 (1976); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234–35 (1972); Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 247
(1968).
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Justice Thomas’s dissent in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association, 131
S.Ct. 2729, 2758–59 (2011), suggests, unintentionally one presumes, that traditionally the state could go very far indeed: “In the decades leading up to and following the Revolution, the conception of the child’s mind evolved but the duty and
authority of parents remained. Indeed, society paid closer attention to potential
influences on children than before. By weakening earlier forms of patriarchal
authority, the Revolution enhanced the importance of childrearing and education
in ensuring social stability. Teachers and schools came under scrutiny, and children’s reading material was carefully supervised. Laws reflected these concerns and
often supported parental authority with the coercive power of the state” (emphasis
added) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Thomas cites Benjamin
Rush, among other authorities, to support the contention that, at the time of the
founding generation, parents had total control over their children’s lives. It would
be more accurate to say that what Rush supported was total state control over
the lives of its future citizens. See Benjamin Rush, “Thoughts upon the Mode of
Education Proper in a Republic,” in Essays on Education in the Early Republic,
ed. Frederick Rudolph (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965) 11 (“From the
observations that have been made it is plain, that I consider it possible to convert
men into republican machines. This must be done if we expect them to perform
their parts properly, in the great machine of the government of the state”); see also
Rush, “Thoughts upon the Mode of Education,” 14 (“Let our pupil be taught that
he does not belong to himself, but that he is public property. Let him be taught
to love his family, but let him be taught at the same time that he must forsake
and even forget them when the welfare of his country requires it”). Among other
measures meant to produce republican uniformity of character, Rush urged the
creation of a federal university “where the youth of all the states may be melted (as
it were) into one mass of citizens.” 1 Letters of Benjamin Rush, ed. Lyman H. Butterfield (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951) 388.
Meyer v. State, 187 N.W. 100, 104 (Neb. 1922) (Letton, J., dissenting); cf. Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45, 67 (1908) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“The capacity to
impart instruction to others is given by the Almighty for beneficent purposes and
its use may not be forbidden or interfered with by Government,—certainly not,
unless such instruction is, in its nature, harmful to the public morals or imperils
the public safety”).
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42. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534.
43. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 213; cf. State v. Counort, 124 P. 910, 911–12 (Wash. 1912) (rejecting homeschooling claim) (“We do not think that the giving of instruction by a
parent to a child, conceding the competency of the parent to fully instruct the
child in all that is taught in the public schools, is within the meaning of the law ‘to
attend a private school.’ Such a requirement means more than home instruction.
It means the same character of school as the public school, a regular, organized
and existing institution, making a business of instructing children of school age in
the required studies and for the full time required by the laws of this state”).
44. See, e.g., Kenneth B. O’Brien Jr., “Education, Americanization, and the Supreme
Court: The 1920’s,” American Quarterly 13 (1961): 161, 171 (“It is difficult to overestimate the import [of these cases]”); see also, e.g., Stephen Arons, “The Separation
of School and State: Pierce Reconsidered,” Harv. Educ. Rev. 46 (1976): 76; cf.
Stephen L. Carter, “Parents, Religion, and Schools: Reflections on Pierce, 70 Years
Later,” Seton Hall L. Rev. 27 (1997): 1194.
Even Pope Pius XI lavished praise on Pierce, writing in a 1929 encyclical letter
on education: “This incontestable right of the family has at various times been
recognized by nations anxious to respect the natural law in their civil enactments.
Thus, to give one recent example, the Supreme Court of the United States of
America, in a decision on an important controversy, declared that it is not in
the competence of the State to fix any uniform standard of education by forcing
children to receive instruction exclusively in public schools, and it bases its decision on the natural law: the child is not the mere creature of the State; those who
nurture him and direct his destiny have the right coupled with the high duty, to
educate him and prepare him for the fulfillment of his obligations.” Divini Illius
Magistri (“On the Christian Education of Youth”) (Dec. 31, 1929), 37, at http://
www.vatican.va/holy_father/pius_xi/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xi_enc_31121929
_divini-illiusmagistri_en.html, cited in David R. Upham, “Pierce v. Society of Sisters, Natural Law, and the Pope’s Extraordinary—But Undeserved—Praise of the
American Republic” [Draft], 4, at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=2018396; see also Christopher Wolfe, “The Supreme Court and Catholic
Social Thought,” Am. J. Juris. 29 (1984): 45, 50–51.
45. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 239 (White, J., concurring).
46. Consider the dissenting opinion of Judge (and later Supreme Court Justice)
Peckham, who would author Lochner, in People v. Budd, 117 N.Y. 1, 47 (1889)
(Peckham, J., dissenting): “I have spoken thus somewhat at length upon this
subject . . . for the purpose of showing that, because the rule [regarding common
carriers] is correctly stated in those cases, no reason exists in such fact for the
extension of the principle of that rule to other cases, and, by doing so, go back to
the seventeenth or eighteenth century ideas of paternal government, and thereby
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54.
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58.

wholly ignore the later and, as I firmly believe, the more correct ideas which an
increase of civilization and a fuller knowledge of the fundamental laws of political
economy, and a truer conception of the proper functions of government have
given us at the present day. Rights which we would now regard as secured to us
by our bill of rights against all assaults, from whatever quarter, were in those days
regarded as the proper subjects of legislative interference and suppression. The
fact that certain rules of the common law have come down to us unimpaired,
although based upon a view of the relations of government to the people which
obtained in the seventeenth century, should certainly furnish no reason for extending those rules to cases which, but for such extension, would be regarded as clearly
within the protection of the constitutional limitations contained in our bill of
rights.”
Both liberals and conservatives have sought to distance Meyer and Pierce from
Lochner (or, at least, from what David E. Bernstein calls the “mythical, evil
Lochner” of modern constitutional law). See Rehabilitating Lochner: Defending
Individual Rights Against Progressive Reform (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2011) 108–24. As Bernstein argues, this distancing is more strategically
prudent than historically sound. “Justice Peckham’s enunciation of an expansive
liberty-protective interpretation of the [Due Process Clause] in Lochner (and
Allgeyer) begot Justice McReynolds’ even more expansive opinion in Meyer,
which continues to serve as the constitutional foundation of various Fourteenth
Amendment rights protected by the Supreme Court.” Bernstein, Rehabilitating
Lochner, 124.
Employment Div., Dept. of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233 (1972).
Smith, 494 U.S. at 881. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 234.
Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166–67
[1878]).
The Yoder Court suggested that its holding might be limited to “a free exercise
claim of the nature revealed by this record.” See 406 U.S. at 233.
Stephen Gilles, “On Educating Children: A Parentalist Manifesto,” U. Chi. L.
Rev. 63 (1996): 937.
See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
Meyer, “Paradox of Family Privacy,” 527.
530 U.S. 57 (2000).
Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer Prods., 68 F.3d 525, 533 (1st Cir. 1995).
Cf. Bertrand Fry, “Breeding Constitutional Doctrine: The Provenance and Progeny of the ‘Hybrid Situation’ in Current Free Exercise Jurisprudence,” Tex. L. Rev.
71 (1993): 833, 62 (“About the lack of coherent protection there can be no doubt.
In different areas of law, the hybrid situation doctrine generates different effects”).
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59. Cf. John P. Forren, “Revisiting Four Popular Myths about the Peyote Case,” U. Pa.
J. Const. L. 8 (2006): 209, 219 (“Smith left lower court judges . . . with extraordinary
amounts of doctrinal leeway to decide precisely what controlling First Amendment
precedents now required them to do”).
60. See http://www.parentalrights.org/index.asp?Type=B_BASIC&SEC={DE675888E60A-4219–8A5E-000083244D13}&DE=. The justification of the amendment rests
on twin pillars of concern for the uncertain status of parental rights. First, supporters worry that the federal courts have been less than strident in their defense of
the right to parent. Second, supporters worry about erosion of parental authority
should the United States ratify the United Nations Convention on the Rights of
the Child. The amendment reads in its entirety: “Section 1: The liberty of parents
to direct the upbringing and education of their children is a fundamental right.
Section 2: Neither the United States nor any State shall infringe upon this right
without demonstrating that its governmental interest as applied to the person is of
the highest order and not otherwise served. Section 3: No treaty may be adopted
nor shall any source of international law be employed to supersede, modify, interpret, or apply to the rights guaranteed by this article.”
Since 1990, critics of Smith have also sought a statutory return to the heightened
review of free exercise claims. In 1993, Congress passed the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA), which reinstated Yoder’s strict scrutiny standard for any
federal or state action that “substantially burden[s] a person’s exercise of religion
even if that burden results from a rule of general applicability.” See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000bb-1(b) (1993) (“Government may substantially burden a person’s exercise of
religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person—(1) is
in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive
means of furthering that compelling governmental interest”). The federal RFRA
was overturned insofar as it applied to the states. See City of Boerne v. Flores,
521 U.S. 507 (1997). But cf. Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente Uniao do
Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006) (upholding under RFRA decision enjoining federal
government from enforcing Controlled Substances Act to ban use of hoasca, a tea
with hallucinogenic properties, in religious ceremonies). The downfall of RFRA as
applied to the states led to the passage of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), Pub. L. No. 106–274, 114 Stat. 803 (2000) (codified at
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc [2000] (applying strict scrutiny to prisoner rights and discriminatory land use claims). A number of states have passed RFRAs of their own. See
Christopher C. Lund, “Religious Liberty After Gonzales: A Look at State RFRAs,”
S.D. L. Rev. 55 (2010): 466, 466–67 n.7 & 477 n.67 (citing and describing state
statutes). The successful assertion of fundamental rights under state RFRA regimes
has been modest at best. Lund, 479–96. It should also be noted that some states
interpret their state constitutions to be more protective of religious liberty than the
federal constitution. Lund, “Religious Liberty After Gonzales,” 478.
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61. Meyer, “What Constitutional Law Can Learn from the ALI Principles,” 1090.
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. at 86 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
62. Cf. generally James G. Dwyer, The Relationship Rights of Children (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2006); Dwyer, “Parents’ Religion and Children’s
Welfare: Debunking the Doctrine of Parents’ Rights,” Calif. L. Rev. 82 (1994): 1371.
63. Cf. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. at 88 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“A parent’s rights
with respect to her child have thus never been regarded as absolute, but rather are
limited by the existence of an actual, developed relationship with a child, and are
tied to the presence or absence of some embodiment of family. These limitations
have arisen, not simply out of the definition of parenthood itself, but because of
this Court’s assumption that a parent’s interests in a child must be balanced against
the State’s long-recognized interests as parens patriae and, critically, the child’s
own complementary interest in preserving relationships that serve her welfare and
protection”) (citations omitted).
64. Martha Minow, Making All the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion, and American
Law (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990) 293; see also Making All the Difference, 383 (“Especially in struggles to secure greater respect for those . . . who
remained dependent after others had secured rights for autonomous action, rights
provide a rhetoric for naming and scrutinizing both private and public power”).
Indeed, as Minow observes, asserting rights is one way that people can “signal and
strengthen their relation to a community.” Making All the Difference, 294.
65. From fiduciary principles one might argue in favor of strong deference to parental
choices. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott and Robert E. Scott, “Parents as Fiduciaries,”
Va. L. Rev. (1995): 2401.
66. Cf., e.g., Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Social Discourse
(New York: Free Press, 1991) 110; Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio 431 U.S.
494, 544 (1997) (White, J., dissenting). On the rise and fall of the rights critique
generated by Critical Legal Studies, see Robin West, Normative Jurisprudence: An
Introduction (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011) 107–76.
Soon after the Supreme Court’s decision in Pierce, future justice Felix Frankfurter issued a similar warning about the illiberal use of due process in the service
of liberalism: “For ourselves, we regard the cost of this power of the Supreme
Court on the whole as greater than its gains. After all, the hysteria and chauvinism that forbade the teaching of German in Nebraska schools may subside, and
with its subsidence bring repeal of the silly measure; the narrow margin by which
the Oregon law was carried in 1922 may, with invigorated effort on the part of
the liberal forces, result in its repeal, at least by a narrow margin. But when the
Supreme Court strikes down legislation directed against trade unions, or enshrines
the labor injunction into the Constitution, or denies to women in industry the
meagre protection of minimum wage legislation, we are faced with action more
far-reaching, because ever so much more durable and authoritative than even the
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68.

69.
70.

71.
72.
73.

most mischievous of repealable state legislation. . . . And here is ample warning
to the liberal forces that the real battles of liberalism are not won in the Supreme
Court. To a large extent the Supreme Court, under the guise of constitutional
interpretation of words whose contents are derived from the disposition of the
Justices, is the reflector of that impalpable but controlling thing, the general drift
of public opinion. Only a persistent, positive translation of the liberal faith into the
thoughts and acts of the community is the real reliance against the unabated temptation to straitjacket the human mind.” See Felix Frankfurter, “Can the Supreme
Court Guarantee Toleration?,” New Republic, June 17, 1925, 85, 86–87.
Compare Frank I. Michelman on the role that a counter-ideology can play in
constitutional law and theory. “The Supreme Court, 1985 Term—Foreword:
Traces of Self-Government,” Harv. L. Rev. 100 (1986) 4, 17–18: “The role is that of
a counter-ideology, a normative political vision to set against the vision believed
to have predominated in the thought of the framers and in the Constitution they
framed. Such a visionary ‘opposite,’ if reasonably clear and coherent, may serve
a number of heuristic and argumentative functions important to constitutional
lawyers. Viewed as a rejected alternative, the ‘opposite’ can be used to clarify the
assumptions and aims of the prevailing scheme. Viewed as a partially accepted
or surviving competitor, it offers lawyers both a framework for interpretive debate
and a premise for ‘deviationist doctrine.’ We can dispute constitutional issues, and
innovate doctrinal futures, by debating the extent to which the ‘opposite’ survived
and entered into the Constitution as a detectable, significant influence, fairly
invocable in the work of interpretation.”
Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 257 (1983); see also Caban v. Mohammed, 441
U.S. 380 (1979); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645 (1972); cf. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504–05 (1977).
Locke, Two Treatises, II, VI, § 54.
See generally David A. J. Richards, “The Individual, the Family, and the Constitution: A Jurisprudential Perspective,” N.Y.U. L. Rev. 55 (1980): 1. Richards argues
that “the hermeneutics of constitutional interpretation must explicate background
concepts of liberal political theory because the meaning of constitutional rights is
best explained in light of the theoretical perspective of the Founders and a reasonable elaboration of that perspective in contemporary circumstances.” Richards,
7 n.46.
Kenneth Maddock, The Australian Aborigines: A Portrait of Their Society (Ringwood: Penguin, 1972) 193–94.
Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. at 397 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Jennifer Nedelsky, “Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities,” Yale J.L. & Feminism 1 (1989): 7, 12; see also Elizabeth Bartholet, Nobody’s
Children: Abuse and Neglect, Foster Drift, and the Adoption Alternative (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1999) 3 (“Children will be able to thrive in our society only if we
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77.
78.
79.
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82.

begin to think of children born to other people, and to other racial groups, and to
poor people, and to people who live elsewhere, as in some sense ‘ours.’”).
William Shakespeare, A Midsummer Night’s Dream, IV.1.190–91. All references to
Shakespeare are to The Complete Works of Shakespeare, ed. David Bevington (New
York: Longman, 1997). The midsummer night’s forest journey is a passage away
from possessive pronouns. Consider the language of Egeus, Hermia’s father, who,
at the start of the play, seeks to dispose of his daughter as he sees fit: “Scornful
Lysander! true, he hath my love / And what is mine my love shall render him. / And
she is mine, and all my right of her / I do estate unto Demetrius.” I.1.95–98; cf.
Nedelsky, “Reconceiving Autonomy,” 12 (The possessive pronoun evokes “the
isolated, distancing symbol of property”).
Locke, Two Treatises, II, VI, § 149. Does the state’s authority to act for certain
ends imply a duty to do so? Not as a matter of constitutional law doctrine. See
DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989). But cf.
Robin West, “Unenumerated Duties,” U. Pa. J. Const. L. 9 (2006): 221.
Cf. generally, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, “Responsible Republicanism: Educating for
Citizenship,” U. Chi. L. Rev. 62 (1995): 131; Stanley Ingber, “Socialization, Indoctrination, or the ‘Pall of Orthodoxy’: Value Training in the Public Schools,” U. Ill.
L. Rev. 1987 (1987): 15.
Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535.
Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, “Who Owns the Child?: Meyer and Pierce and the
Child as Property,” Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 33 (1992): 995, 1001.
Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853
(1982); see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 482 (“[T]he State may not,
consistently with the spirit of the First Amendment, contract the spectrum of available knowledge”).
West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943). Harry Brighouse,
“School Vouchers, Separation of Church and State, and Personal Autonomy,” in
Moral and Political Education, eds. Stephen Macedo and Yael Tamir (New York:
New York University Press, 2002) 244, 247.
See Bruce A. Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980) 159 (“The entire educational system will, if you like, resemble
a great sphere. Children land upon the sphere at different points, depending on
their primary culture; the task is to help them explore the globe in a way that
permits them to glimpse the deeper meanings of the dramas passing on around
them. At the end of the journey, however, the now mature citizen has every right
to locate himself at the very point from which he began—just as he may also strike
out to discover an unoccupied portion of the sphere”).
See Joel Feinberg, “The Child’s Right to an Open Future,” in Whose Child?: Children’s Rights, Parental Authority, and State Power, eds. William Aiken and Hugh
LaFollette (Totowa: Adams & Co., 1980) 124–53.
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83. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 683 (1967).
84. Cf. Stanley Ingber, Comment, “Religious Children and the Inevitable Compulsion of Public Schools,” Case W. Res. L. Rev. 43 (1993): 773, 778–79 (“A value-free
curriculum is clearly impossible. . . . [S]chools simply cannot attain value-neutral
or balanced education. With only limited resources and time, they cannot possibly
provide curricula that encompass the world’s enormous mass of information and
perspectives. Furthermore, subtle characteristics such as style and emphasis may
undermine any substantive success in achieving balanced presentations. Even
if these practical difficulties could be overcome, an insurmountable conceptual
problem remains: Value neutrality itself has a value bias favoring the liberal philosophy embodied by the scientific method of inquiry”) (footnote omitted).
85. Thomas Jefferson, “The Statute of Virginia for Religious Freedom” (1786), in
The Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom: Its Evolution and Consequences in
American History, eds. Merrill D. Peterson and Robert C. Vaughan (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1988) xvii.
86. The phrase “omnivorous peer-culture” belongs to Richard Hofstadter. See AntiIntellectualism in American Life (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963) 383.
87. Cf. Stephen Macedo, “The Constitution, Civic Virtue, and Civil Society: Social
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